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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Dr. Jonathan Fellus (Fellus) appeals the denial of his motion for summary 
judgment and the grant of Select Medical Holdings Corporation (Select) and Columbia 
Casualty Company’s (Columbia) cross-motions for summary judgment.  The District 
Court correctly determined that Fellus’ conduct of having a sexual affair with his patient 
fell outside the scope of his employment, and he was therefore not insured by his 
employer’s malpractice insurance policy.  Because we agree that Select and Columbia 
were not obligated to provide Fellus with a defense or indemnification from a suit arising 
from his misconduct, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
 We write for the parties, and in so doing communicate only those facts necessary 
for the disposition of this matter.  Fellus was a neurologist employed by the Kessler 
Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc. (Kessler), a wholly owned subsidiary of Select.  Fellus 
and Kessler were insured through a policy that Columbia issued to Select, which 
provided coverage for claims against Kessler employees arising from “acts within the 
scope of their employment.” App. 0338.  Under the terms of the policy, Select was 
responsible for the first $2 million of an insured’s costs, with Columbia covering costs 
exceeding that amount up to $10 million.  The Columbia policy dictates Select’s liability; 
the policy states that the same terms and conditions determine both Columbia and 
Select’s duty to defend or indemnify a Kessler employee.  Fellus contends the terms of 
the policy entitle him to reimbursement for the costs and fees incurred as a result of the 
suit brought by his former patient, Ms. Lorette Schroth (Schroth). 
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 In August 2008, Fellus treated Schroth for a head injury sustained during a car 
accident.  After Schroth’s initial medical examination, she wrote Fellus that she would 
not mind if he asked her out on a date.  Fellus and Schroth began a sexual affair, 
consisting of rendezvous in his examination room, his home, and a hotel.  When Schroth 
ultimately became pregnant, Fellus provided funds for her abortion and then ended their 
relationship.  Schroth exhibited suicidal tendencies and was admitted to a clinic for 
treatment.  Upon her discharge, Schroth was instructed to follow up with her neurologist 
and returned to see Fellus.  During this final visit, Fellus requested and received oral sex 
from Schroth in his exam room. 
In September 2010, Schroth filed suit against Fellus in New Jersey state court, 
alleging that Fellus had engaged in an inappropriate sexual relationship in violation of the 
Board of Medical Examiners’ general rules of practice, NJAC 13:35-6.3, inflicted 
intentional emotional distress, caused negligent emotional distress, and committed 
medical malpractice.1  The matter proceeded to trial, after which a jury awarded Ms. 
Schroth $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $1.7 million in punitive damages, as 
well as prejudgment interest of $360,328.77, resulting in a total of $3,560,328.77.  The 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the compensatory damages 
but remanded the punitive damages to determine their reasonableness.  The trial court 
ultimately amended the punitive damages to 1 million dollars.   
 
1 Schroth’s claims against Kessler were dismissed prior to trial.  The medical malpractice 
claim against Fellus was dismissed “on the motion of the plaintiff” at the start of trial, on 
April 15, 2015. 
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Fellus filed a declaratory judgment complaint claiming that Select and Columbia 
had a duty to defend and indemnify him in the Schroth litigation and must reimburse him 
for the costs.  Select and Columbia removed the action to the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, and the parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted Select and Columbia’s motion and denied Fellus’ 
motion.  Fellus now appeals. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1), and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review the 
grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.” Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United 
States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “must set 
forth specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party’s favor, 
thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 
418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).  “On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
construes facts and draws inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under 
consideration is made.” Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 386 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
III 
 Fellus contends that Select and Columbia were obligated to defend or indemnify 
him in the Schroth litigation and he is therefore owed reimbursement for all costs 
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resulting from that action.  In deciding this claim, we turn to the plain language of the 
policy, which the parties agree is construed under New Jersey law. See Zacarias v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 775 A.2d 1262, 1264 (N.J. 2001) (“[T]he words of an insurance policy 
are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning.”). 
Fellus’ argument that he qualifies as an insured under the terms of the Columbia 
policy is unavailing.  The plain language of the policy states that employees are insured 
“only for acts within the scope of their employment by [Select].” App. 0338.  If a Kessler 
employee is deemed insured, the policy covers professional liability claims “arising out 
of the rendering of ‘professional services,’” defined as services “to care for or assist 
[Kessler] patients.” App. 0352, 0407.  Thus, under the policy’s plain language, Columbia 
and Select would be obligated to indemnify Fellus only if his sexual relationship fell 
within the scope of his employment.  Even if such a finding were possible, Fellus would 
be entitled to claim coverage only if his affair constituted a professional service.  
Interpreting the policy to allow for coverage would defy both governing law and common 
sense.  
Under New Jersey law, an employee’s action is considered to be within the scope 
of his or her employment if “(a) it is of the kind [they] are employed to perform; (b) it 
occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least 
in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer], and (d) if force is intentionally used by the 
[employee] against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the [employer].”2 
 
2 The fourth prong is not at issue here because Schroth did not allege that force was 
intentionally used. 
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Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958); Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460, 465 
(N.J. 2003) (holding that the scope of employment is analyzed under the Restatement). 
First, Fellus’ actions with Schroth were not of the kind he was employed to 
perform. According to his employment contract with Kessler, he was to commit his 
“entire professional time . . . to the affairs of the Institute in the practice of the profession 
of medicine.” App. 0316.  Fellus does not assert that Kessler considered his engaging in 
sexual relations with his patient related to his employment.  Indeed, such an assertion 
would have been specious.  The Code of Conduct of the Board of Medical Examiners 
forbids such behavior, stating that “[i]t is beyond dispute that sexual contact with patient 
[sic] is in conflict of the very essence of the practice of medicine. . . . It is well 
established that sexual activity between physicians and patients is almost always harmful 
to the patient and is prohibited.” App. 1249 (emphasis added).  Fellus himself admitted 
his relationship was outside the bounds of a doctor-patient relationship and “totally 
inappropriate.” App. 0869, 0880.  It is beyond question that his employer would have 
agreed.  See Davis v. Devereux Found., 37 A.3d 469, 492 (N.J. 2012) (finding an 
employee’s actions outside the scope of employment because there “is no suggestion that 
in its hiring, training and supervision” the employer “ever tolerated, let alone 
encouraged,” the act which the employee was accused of committing).   
Second, Fellus’ sexual relations with Schroth did not occur substantially within the 
time or space limits authorized by his employment with Kessler.  Damages were awarded 
for Fellus’ conduct over the course of their romantic relationship, not for his treatment of 
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her as his patient.  In fact, much of the actionable relationship occurred outside of his 
examination room, in locations such as his home and a hotel.  
Third, Dr. Fellus admitted this was a “romantic” relationship with “elements of 
sex.” App. 0869.  His actions were in no way in service to his employer and for this 
reason alone exceeded the scope of his employment.  See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 
732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding a physician’s assistant’s seduction of a patient 
was in the physician’s assistant’s own interest, not in the interest of his employer).  
Fellus contends that his sexual relationship with Schroth was within the scope of 
his employment because, “but for” his employment, their relationship would have been 
permissible.  Fellus knowingly engaged in an impermissible sexual relationship, 
flagrantly disavowing his profession’s code of conduct.  Blaming his employer for 
rendering his audacious conduct impermissible is unpersuasive at best.  Under his 
rationale, any interaction between doctor and patient, not matter how abusive or 
predatory, would be deemed within the scope of employment and covered by Columbia’s 
policy.  The District Court was correct in determining Fellus was not acting as a doctor 
when he engaged in sexual relations with his patient.3 
IV 
Because Fellus’ actions occurred outside of the scope of his employment, he is not 
insured by the policy, and is therefore not entitled to defense or indemnification for either 
 
3 Because Fellus conduct exceeded the scope of his employment, there is no need to 
evaluate whether his affair constituted a “professional liability claim,” although a plain 
reading of the policy establishes that Fellus sexual relationship did not constitute a 
professional service conducted on behalf of his employer. 
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the compensatory or punitive damages.  The District Court’s order granting Select and 
Columbia’s motion for summary judgment will be affirmed. 
